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ABSTRACT 1
Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of
foreign investors in international investment law and plays an important
role in several aspects of the protection of foreign investors. In
particular, certain standards of investment protection, notably "full
protection and security" ("FPS") include an obligation for the State to
act with due diligence.
This articles seeks to establish an explanatory framework for past
and future decisions of arbitral tribunals which have applied or will be
confronted to applications of the due diligence standard in international
investment law, by providing a typology of the different possible
applications of the standard in relation to the obligations of the host
State. It addresses the role of due diligence in the law governing State
responsibility, and the application of due diligence in the customary
norms relating to the protection of aliens. Based on these two sections,
it next discusses the principle in contemporary investment law, focusing
on the application of due diligence in the FPS, the international
minimum standard ("IMS") and the fair and equitable treatment
("FET") standards of treatment. It then addresses the question of
whether applying due diligence allows for the possibility of taking into
account the relative capacities of host States, and the consequences the
application of the due diligence standard has on the compensation for
damages.

INTRODUCTION
Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of
foreign investors in international investment law and plays an important
role in several aspects of the protection of foreign investors. In
particular, certain standards of investment protection, notably "full
protection and security" ("FPS") include an obligation for the State to
act with due diligence.
Due diligence has been considered to be a general principle of
1
Keywords: Investment law, due diligence, protection and security, fair and equitable
treatment, minimum standard, state responsibility, protection of aliens
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law. 2 Its role in international law however is limited and concise, in that
due diligence applies in certain specific situations only.
In
contemporary international law, due diligence requires States to
exercise due diligence only in relation to certain specific conduct that is
required from States under a set rule of international law. If a State is
found in breach of its obligation to exercise due diligence, State
responsibility may then ensue if the act in question is attributable to the
State. For several reasons, the current regime governing international
State responsibility indeed has departed from generalizing the
application of the due diligence standard as a secondary norm for
establishing State responsibility, but due diligence has taken a
prominent place in certain specific areas of international law, as part of
primary norms, notably in international environmental law, 3 the law
relating to diplomatic and consular relations, 4 and international
investment law. The due diligence standard has essentially been
considered in relation to FPS, the international minimum standard
("IMS"), and fair and equitable treatment ("FET").
This article seeks to establish an explanatory framework for the
application of the due diligence standard to host State's obligations in
international investment law, by providing a typology of the different
possible applications of the standard in that respect. In doing so, this
article will draw on the historical origins of the standard to understand
the present relevance of due diligence and to map the contemporary use
of due diligence in international investment law. This article will
translate the historical uses of due diligence into modem investment
treaty standards, notably the FPS and FET standards. This article does
not, therefore, aim at providing a general account of or categorizing all
references to due diligence in awards of arbitral tribunals. This article
focuses on the obligations of States to act in due diligence, and does not
address foreign investors' due diligence obligations. 5

2. Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, in 11 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 2 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., Oxford U. Press, 2012), available at
http://www.arcticcentre.org/loader.aspx?id=78 l 827 l 8-d0c9-4833-97b3-b69299e2fl 27 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015).
3. Id. para. 3.
4. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22(2), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3237, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
5· See Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the
Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 527
(2006); IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 216 (Oxford U. Press, 2008); MARTINS
PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT 256 (Oxford U. Press, 2013); Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of
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I will first address the role of due diligence in the law governing
State responsibility, before addressing the application of due diligence
in the customary norms relating to the protection of aliens. Based on
these two sections, I will discuss the principle in contemporary
investment law, focusing on the application of due diligence in the IMS,
the FPS and FET standards of treatment. I will then address the
contents of the standard, and the question of whether applying due
diligence allows for the possibility of taking into account the relative
capacities of host States, and the consequences the application of the
due diligence standard has on the compensation for damages.

I.

DUE DILIGENCE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The work of the International Law Commission ("ILC") on the
topic of State responsibility originally focused on the responsibility of
States for injuries caused to aliens, 6 despite the more general mandate
given to the ILC by the United Nations General Assembly. 7 Much
attention in the first years of the work of the ILC was thus devoted to
classifying the various categories of injury caused to aliens, and the
ensuing obligation to provide reparation. In doing so, the ILC at that
time had included in certain of its draft articles substantive rules in
relation to the treatment of aliens, such as the "duty of protection" of
States and rules relating to expropriation and nationalization. 8 In view
of the double focus on the responsibility of States for injuries caused to

Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, para. 333 (Sept. 11, 2007); Biwater Gauff
(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para.
602 (Jul. 24, 2008); Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/5, Award, para. 75 (Jul. 26 2001); Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd. &
Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of Moldova, Arbitral Award, 19 (Sept. 22, 2005);
Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3,
Award, para. 58 (May 19 2010).
6. See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Second Rep. on the Responsibility
of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens. Part I:
Acts and Omission, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/106 (Feb. 15, 1957) (by F. V.
Garcia Amador) [hereinafter Second Report]; State Responsibility, INT'L LAW COMM'N,
available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_6.htm (last visited Apr. I, 2015) (all documents
relating to the work of the ILC on the topic State responsibility is located here unless
mentioned otherwise).
7. See G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/2589,
at 52 (Dec. 7, 1953).
8. See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Responsibility of the State for
Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens - Reparation of the
Injury, arts. 7 & 9, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134 (Jan. 26, 1961) (by F. V.
Garcia Amador).
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aliens and on the primary norms in this respect, it is not surprising that
one finds numerous references to the obligations for States to exercise
due diligence in the protection of aliens for acts of third parties in the
early work of the ILC on this topic. 9
The 2001 Articles on State Responsibility on the contrary focus on
the secondary norms governing State responsibility and do not seek to
define the contents of the primary obligations of States. 10 As a
consequence, whether or not the conduct of the State involves "some
degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want of due diligence ... vary
from one context to the another for reasons which essentially relate to
the object and purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to
the primary obligation." 11 The possible failure to exercise due diligence
is not constitutive of State responsibility, unless the primary obligation
contains such an obligation. Then, the failure to act in due diligence or
not will determine whether or not there is a breach of the primary
obligation. This in essence is the consequence of the ILC abandoning
attempts to codify and progressively developing the primary obligations
of States in relation to injuries caused to aliens following the
designation of Roberto Ago as Special Rapporteur on the topic. 12
However, under Ago, much attention still was given to the classification
of different forms of responsibility, in terms of whether the obligation at
stake required for the State to adopt a specific course of conduct, or
required the State to achieve a particular result. 13 This distinction was
finally abandoned by James Crawford in the 2001 final version of the
Articles, essentially because the ILC considered that the distinction
"does not seem to bear specific or direct consequences." 14

9. See Second Report, supra note 6, at 122-23; Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of
International Responsibility (continued), Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 (Jun.
30, 1972) (by Roberto Ago) [hereinafter Fourth Report].
10. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-August 10,
2001 , U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles
on State Responsibility].
11. Id. art. 2 (commentary, para. 3).
12. Fourth Report, supra note 9, at 99-100; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing
the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago 's Classification of Obligations of Means and
Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 371 (1999);
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Dionisio Anzilotti and the Law of International Responsibility of
States, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 139 (1992); Koivurova, supra note 2; Robert P. Bamidge, The Due
Diligence Principle under International Law, 8 INT'L COMMUNITY L. Rev. 81 (2006).
13. See Special Rapporteur, Sixth Rep. on the Internationally Wrongful Act of the
State, Source of International Responsibility (continued), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/302 and Add.
1, 2 & 3 (1977) (by Robert Ago) [hereinafter Sixth Report]; see also Dupuy, supra note 12.
14. ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 12 (commentary).
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As a consequence, whether or not the obligation of a State is one to
obtain a certain result or an obligation of conduct, such as an obligation
to exercise due diligence, is a matter to be determined by the primary
norm only, and the distinction has little or no consequence for the rules
on State responsibility.
I say "little" because there are some
implications in respect of the obligation of reparation ensuing from
responsibility, in function of whether the obligation is one to exercise
due diligence or any other obligation of result, but this is again a
consequence of the type of obligation breached, and does not derive
from any specific secondary norm on state responsibility to this effect. I
will turn back to this at a later stage. That being said, the use of the
principle of due diligence as part of a primary norm, does bear some
resemblance with subjective responsibility, which tends to be applicable
in cases where States fail to act or in cases of omissions. 15 The current
approach to State responsibility however, is to view the subjective
aspect of responsibility as part of the primary norm rather than the
secondary norms governing State responsibility.

II.

DUE DILIGENCE AND THE PROTECTION OF ALIENS
Many cases dated from the late 19th Century and early 20th Century
have applied the customary norms relating to the duty of States and
State organs not only to abstain themselves from taking measures that
would infringe on the security of aliens and their property, but also the
duty of States to protect the security of aliens and their property from
acts of third parties in their territory. While the first obligation - the
duty for States and State organs to abstain themselves- was not assessed
through the due diligence standard, the second obligation - the duty to
protect against acts of individuals - has been tested through that
standard. 16 I will therefore focus here essentially on the latter
obligation, although I will refer to the former in order to make clear the
distinction between both.
The duty to protect the security of aliens and their property from
acts of third parties in their territory has been accepted since long in
international law. This obligation can be decomposed into three sub-

15· James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International
Responsibility, in MALCOLM D. EVANS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 441, 454-58 (Oxford U. Press,
2010).
16. See Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the
International Responsibility ofStates, 35 GER. Y.B. INT' LL. 9 ( 1992).
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components 17 :
1) the obligation of States to prevent acts of individuals that may
harm the security of aliens and their property, by making use of
their administrative and judicial apparatus to that effect;
2) the obligation of States to apprehend and bring to justice those
responsible for injuries caused to aliens by making use of their
administrative and judicial apparatus to that effect, and
3) the obligation for States to possess and make available to aliens
a judicial and administrative system capable of preventing 18
acts, and of punishing and apprehending those responsible for
the acts.
This distinction between these three obligations is important, since
practice shows that the third obligation - States' obligation to possess
and make available a judicial and administrative system - is tested not
by reference to the due diligence standard, 19 while States' other
obligations have been assessed by reference to the due diligence
standard. 20
These principles have been confirmed in many cases, notably in
the decisions of several Claims Commissions established in the late 19th
Century and early 20th Century. These obligations have been found to
be applicable in cases of occasional acts of third parties, in situations of
public disorder, revolts and violence, and in case of civil war or
international armed conflict. 21
In relation to isolated acts of individuals, in Venable v. Mexico, 22
the Commissioner considered that the acts complained of (essentially
allowing theft of parts of locomotives that had been seized -the
obligation for States to prevent- and not prosecuting those responsible
17. Id. at 25 .
18. The obligation too possess a judicial and administrative system capable of
preventing acts however is very close to the obligation of States to act with due diligence to
prevent acts of individuals. The difference however lies, not only in that due diligence
applies to the latter only, but in that the first covers States' obligations in a specific situation,
while the second concerns States' general obligations to maintain public order and prevent
crimes. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 26-29; Noyes (U.S. v. Panama), 6 R.I.A.A,
308, 311 (U.S.-Panama Gen. Cl. Comm'n 1933).
19. See Second Report, supra note 6, at 110-11.
20. See id. at 120; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 26-29.
21. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 27-29 (discussing the general overview of
the various case-law to this effect).
22. See H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 219-261 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1927).
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for the crime -the obligation for States to apprehend and punish-)
amounted to "an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would
readily recognize its insufficiency." 23 In several other cases, the
specific obligation to apprehend or punish those responsible for the acts
was also confirmed.
In Janes v.
Mexico 24 for instance, the
Commissioner decided, that "there was clearly such a failure on the part
of the Mexican authorities to take prompt and efficient action to
apprehend the slayer," and therefore the Mexican authorities were held
responsible for not having taken "proper steps to apprehend and punish
the slayer of Janes."25 In Kennedy v. Mexico, 26 in which the person
responsible for the injuries caused had been convicted to a sentence
disproportionate to the crime committed and the injuries inflicted, the
Commission decided that "it seems that there was negligence in a
serious degree, and that such negligence constitutes a denial of
justice."27 Since this obligation related to the obligation for States to
possess and make available to aliens a judicial system capable of
punishing those responsible for the acts, the Commission made no
reference to the due diligence standard. 28
In respect of mob violence, riots or civil unrest, several decisions
applied the same principles. Arbitrator Max Huber in the British
Property in Spanish Morocco case 29 confirmed the principle that in the
events of riots ("banditry, which results in a state of general insecurity,
but without the situation amounting, strictly speaking, to a state of
rebellion") 30 States have a duty of vigilance towards aliens. In Youmans
v. Mexico, the Commissioner also held that in case of "mob violence",
States incur responsibility if "a lack of diligence in the punishment of
the persons implicated in the crime" is shown. 31

23. Id. para. 23.
24. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 82-98 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1925).
25. Id. at 85-86, paras. 10, 17.
26. Kennedy (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A.194-203 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. Comm'n
1927) (concurring opinion by American Commissioner).
27. Id. para. 5.
28. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 30.
29. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 615, 642, 645 (U.K.Spain 1925); see also Great-Britain United States Mixed Commission, 9 RI.A.A. 144
(1920).
30. Original in French ('actes de brigandage, dont resulte un etat d' insecurite generale,
sans toutefois qu' il y'ait, a proprement parler un etat de rebellion ' - translation by the
author). British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain 1925).
31. Youmans (U.S. v. Mexico), Gen. Claims Comm'n, 110-17 (1926).
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Finally, in relation to insurrectional movements, one can refer to
the Sambiaggio case, decided in the context of the Italy-Venezuela
Mixed Claims Commission, in which the Commission held that
Venezuela would be responsible for acts occurred during the revolution,
if "Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent
damages from being inflicted by revolutionists. " 32
Despite the occasional use of terms such as "indirect
responsibility" 33 in early cases, which was in essence the consequence
of the ambiguity that existed at that time on the question of whether the
State was responsible for the injury caused to the alien, or rather was
responsible only for the failure to exercise due diligence in preventing
the injury or apprehending and punishing the responsible individuals, 34
which of course had important consequences in respect of the
compensation awarded, the responsibility of States for breaching their
obligations in relation to the protection of aliens is not an "indirect
responsibility" of the State for the act committed; the act which has
caused harm in itself cannot be attributed to the State. 35 This does not
imply, however, that the reparation awarded may not take account of the
damages caused by the act, but this will depend on the circumstances of
each case. Indeed, in principle, the reparation should first of all remedy
the obligation breached, which is not the act of the individual, but the
obligation of the State to act in due diligence to prevent an injury caused
to an alien or the failure to exercise due diligence in apprehending and
punishing the individual responsible for that injury. This was famously
posited by Max Huber in the mentioned British Property in Morocco
case, which not only confirmed the application of the due diligence
standards, but also confirmed the absence of any direct responsibility of
the State for the commission of the act itself 36:
It seems indisputable that the State is not responsible for a riot,
rebellion, civil war or international war nor for the fact that these
events cause damage on its territory.
This principle of absence of responsibility does not exclude the duty to

32. Sambiaggio (Italy v. Venezuela), IO R.I.A.A. 499, 524 (Mixed Claims
Commission 1903).
33. See H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 229, para. 23. (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1927).
34. Second Report, supra note 6, at 34; Sixth Report, supra, note 13, at 99.
35. Sixth Report, supra note 13, at 100.
36. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 709-10 (U.K.-Spain
1925).
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exercise certain vigilance. While the State is not responsible for the
revolutionary events themselves, it may nevertheless be responsible
for what the authorities are doing or not doing to avert, to the extent
possible, the consequences. Responsibility for the action or inaction
of public power is completely different from responsibility for acts
attributable to individuals who are beyond the influence of the
authorities or who are openly hostile to the authorities. 37

In Janes, the Commissioner also pointed out that "in cases of
improper governmental action of this type [denial of justice], a nation is
never held to be liable for anything else than the damage caused by
what the executive or the legislative committed or omitted itself." 38 As
a consequence, "the measure of damages for which the Government
should be liable can not be computed by merely stating the damages
caused by the private delinquency of Carbajal. " 39 These principles still
stand today. 40
This early practice has been particularly relevant for the recent
application of due diligence in the context of international investment
law. Considering that the current investment regime is partly rooted in
the general customary norms governing the treatment of aliens in
international law, this is not surprising. Indeed, full protection and
security ("FPS"), the international minimum standard ("IMS"), and fair
and equitable treatment ("FET") share many features with that
customary norm.

III. DUE DILIGENCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
Although it is not the purpose here to engage in an all-inclusive
discussion of the exact contents of these standards of treatment, it is

37. Original in French ('Il parait incontestable que l' Etat n' est pas responsable pour le
fait d'une emeute, revolte, guerre civile ou guerre intemationale, ni pour le fait que ces
evenements provoquent des dommages sur son territoire. [... ] Le principe de la nonresponsabilite n'exclut point le devoir d'exercer une certaine vigilance. Si l'Etat n'est pas
responsable des evenements revolutionnaires eux-memes, il peut etre neanmoins
responsable de ce que les autorites font ou ne font pas, pour parer, dans la mesure possible,
aux suites. La responsabilite pour l'action ou l'inaction de la puissance publique est tout
autre chose que la responsabilite pour des actes imputables a des personnes echappant a
l 'influence des autorites ou leur etant ouvertement hostiles.' - translation by the author). Id.
at 642.
38. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 88, para 22. (Mex.-U.S. Gen.
Cl. Comm'n 1925).
39. Id. at 89, para 25.
40. See Crawford & Olleson, supra note 15, at 454-55.
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necessary to briefly sketch their main characteristics and their
interconnectedness in order to better grasp the role of due diligence in
assessing breaches of these standards.
FPS, IMS, and FET are generally referred to as non-contingent,
absolute or objective standards of treatment as opposed to contingent,
relative or subjective standards, such as national treatment ("NT") or the
most favored nation treatment ("MFN"). 41 The latter category of
standards of treatment impose on the host State the obligation to act in a
certain way by reference to how other investors or investments are
treated, e.g. national investors or investments in case of NT, or investors
or investments from third States in case of MFN treatment. The
objective of such standards is that States may not discriminate between
investors and investments; whether or not the State has exercised due
diligence in this respect is irrelevant. Objective standards, on the other
hand, require from the State to act in a certain "objective" way, as
required under international law (either custom or treaty law)
irrespective of how other investors or investments are treated. There is,
in other words, no comparison with the treatment of other investors or
investments.
This categorization partially explains the presence of due diligence
in those standards of treatment. Indeed, when the acts of States are
tested against how other investors or investments are treated, there is
neither room nor need to apply a due diligence standard. The standard
to be applied when dealing with relative standards is a comparative
standard: how other investors or investments have been treated.
Whether the State was diligent or not is irrelevant. Conversely, when
the acts of States are tested against absolute standards under FPS, IMS
and FET, how other investors or investments are treated is irrelevant;
the conduct and acts of States are tested against requirements for such
conduct or acts under international law. The assessment standard of a
breach of the latter category of standards then requires a comparison
with an objective assessment standard: how investors and investments
should be treated under international law. This comparator/objective
assessment in certain interpretations of FPS, and partly also in the IMS
and FET as will be explained, is the due diligence standard - the
conduct of a diligent State.
However, the "objectivity" of the absolute treatment standards will

See

& MATTHEW WEINIGER,
207, para 7.19
(Oxford U. Press, 2008); Nicolas Angelet, Fair and Equitable Treatment, in 3 MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1094 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2012).
41.

CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC, LAURENCE SHORE

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT
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vary by operation of the due diligence standard if one considers that the
circumstances and resources of the host State should be taken into
account when applying the due diligence requirement, which I will
discuss below. In that sense even absolute standards of treatment carry
a subjective element, although the latter should not be understood as
implying a comparison with how other investors or investments are or
have been treated.

A. Due Diligence and the International Minimum Standard
The exact relation between FPS, the IMS and FET is still subject to
much debate. It has been contented that FPS forms part of the IMS, 42 or
that FET and FPS are included in the IMS.43 Others have contended to
the contrary that all three standards or treatment are independent treaty
standards. 44 Despite these controversies, which I do not intend to settle
here, it is beyond doubt that all three-treatment standards have certain
commonalities, and thus overlap in certain aspects. 45 The overlap is
particularly noticeable in context of the State's duty to protect foreign
investors and investments from acts of third parties, and thus, as will be
shown in the application of the due diligence standard to such
obligation. The overlap, in essence, is a consequence of the fact that
these standards, whether one views them as autonomous standards or
not, are rooted in the general rule relating to States' obligations in
respect of the protection of aliens discussed above. The obligations to
which the due diligence standard applies, and thus those that I will
consider here, are part of the FPS or FET, and whether one views these
standards as embodied in the IMS is irrelevant for our purposes.

42. See Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT'L DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 353, 354 (2010). The decision of the Tribunal in Noble Ventures argued that
"[w]ith regard to the Claimant's argument that the Respondent breached Art. II (2)(a) of the
BIT which stipulates that the 'Investment shall . .. enjoy fall protection and security ', the
Tribunal notes: that it seems doubtful whether that provision can be understood as being
wider in scope than the general duty to provide for protection and security of foreign
nationals found in the customary international law of aliens." Noble Ventures, Inc. v.
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 164 (Oct 12, 2005).
43. See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA FREE
TRADE COMM 'N (July 31 , 2001 ), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/
Commission/CH 11 understanding_e.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
44. Schreuer, supra note 42, at 362.
45. Jan de Nul N.V. & Dredging Int'l N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/13, Award, para. 269 (Nov. 6, 2008) (stating that "[t]he notion of continuous
protection and security is to be distinguished here from the fair and equitable standard since
they are placed in two different provisions of the BIT, even if the two guarantees can
overlap"); see also PSEG Global Inc. & Konya Ilgin Elektrik Oretim ve Ticaret Limited
Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 258 (Jan. 19, 2007).
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Situations covered by the FPS indeed will reqmre conduct m
accordance to the IMS.
To give one example, in the Neer case, often quoted as
representing the IMS, although not without controversy in respect of the
application of that decision to modem investment law, 46 the US/Mexico
General Claims Commission described the IMS as follows:
[T]he propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of
international standards, and (second) that the treatment of an alien, in
order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient
execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the
country do not empower the authorities to measure up to international
standards is immaterial. 47
This statement in actual fact related to a situation typically covered
by a contemporary FPS provision, as understood in physical protection
from acts of third parties, as it related to the obligation of Mexico to
apprehend and punish those responsible for the acts. 48 The scenario of
that case, although seen as defining the IMS, is applicable to FPS as
well. To that extent, it is beyond doubt that the IMS can be seen as
embodied in contemporary treaty obligations relating to the obligation
to provide (full) protection and security. 49 FPS, understood as providing
an obligation for the State to protect against physical violence, is indeed
analogous to the IMS standard represented in the classical theory on the
protection of aliens discussed above, 50 and it is consequently
unnecessary to distinguish both standards in respect of physical
protection from acts of third parties. It is moreover unnecessary since
contemporary investment treaties generally do not refer to the minimum
standard at all, or in isolation of other treaty standards namely without
linking FPS and FET to the IMS.
46 See ROLAND KLAGER, 'FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATEMENT' IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 51-55 (James Crawford SC FBA & John S. Bell FBA, 2013).
47· L. F. H. Neer & Paulene Neer (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 RI.A.A. 60, 61-62 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1926).
48· Id. at 62.
49· See Elettronica Sicula SpA (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15, para. 111 (July 20) ("The
primary standard laid down by Article V is 'the full protection and security required by
international law', in short the 'protection and security' must conform to the minimum
international standard.") [hereinafter ELSI].
50· El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 522 (Oct. 31, 2011 ); see KLAGER, supra note 46, at 292.
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Whether or not FPS entails more than the IMS is a question I will
not settle here, although specific consideration will be given to broader
interpretations of FPS, without taking any position on the correctness of
such a view, in order to verify the possible application in such context
of the due diligence standard. As a consequence, the discussion below
on FPS, understood as the duty to protect foreign investors and
investments from physical violence by third parties, is mutatis mutandis
applicable to the IMS.

B. Due Diligence and Full Protection and Security
Provisions granting protection and security to investments and
investors vary in nature. Some treaties refer to "full protection and
security," while others provide for "protection and security" or
"constant protection and security." 51 It is not the purpose here to
engage in a discussion of these variances, and the standard will be
referred to here as FPS despite the existing differences in wording.
Indeed, the current conception of the FPS standard of treatment
however phrased
comprises the obligation for States to provide
physical or police protection to foreign investments/investors from harm
caused by the State itself or by third parties, which includes the
obligations to prevent, to punish and apprehend, and possess and make
available a functioning administrative and legal system to that effect. 52
Some tribunals moreover have argued that the difference in wording do
"not make a significant difference." 53 Therefore, the addition of terms
such as "constant" or "full" do not change the application of the due
diligence standard rather than a strict liability standard for assessing
breaches of that provision54 nor does the use of "protection" rather than
"protection and security" change the level of police protection a host
State is required to provide. 55

51. See Schreuer, supra note 42 , at 353-69.
52. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends
in Investment Rulemaking, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, 132 (2007), available at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); see also JESWALD
w. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 132, 209-10 (2010); George K. Foster,

Recovering "Protection and Security ": The Treaty Standard's Obscure Origins, Forgotten
Meaning, and Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1095, 1095-156
(2012).
53. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 354 (Sept. 11, 2007).
54. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 50 (June 27, 1990).
55. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 354 (Sept. 11, 2007).
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As said earlier in relation to the customary norm on the protection
of aliens, the obligation to provide FPS applies to acts both of the State
and of third parties under its jurisdiction. 56 Although I will essentially
focus on the latter type of obligation, since I argue that the standard of
due diligence applies primarily to those type of cases, it is nevertheless
necessary to briefly discuss whether or not the due diligence standard
plays a role when the acts of the State itself, or when any of its organs
or other entities the acts of which are attributable to the State, have
physically impaired the investor or investment, are involved. This is
important also to explain investment law cases which have discussed
the due diligence standard in that context.
1. The State's Duty to Abstain
Traditionally, as was explained above, the State's duty to abstain
from infringing the physical protection and security of aliens, which
applies to all State organs and entities the acts of which are attributable
to the State, is not tested by reference to the due diligence standard. 57
This is supported by several cases, such as the Sambiaggio case
mentioned above, in which Umpire Ralston distinguished between the
acts of the State and the acts of revolutionaries, and applied to the
former acts the principle that a State is responsible for the acts of its
organs, while in the latter case, responsibility only was considered
possible in the event of a lack of due diligence. 58 It has also been
confirmed in many other cases, which related to the unlawful killing of
individuals by police officers or the military. 59 The act itself - the
unlawful killing - was considered a breach of an international
obligation of the State, which was attributable to the latter because of
the involvement of State organs. No reference then was made to the
principle of due diligence - the State basically is responsible for the acts
of its organs. If, for example, police officers or the military have caused
harm to a foreigner, whether or not the State has acted with due
diligence to prevent the act is unconnected. The act itself is attributable
to the State. This of course presupposes that the act in question, which

56. See Schreuer, supra note 42, at 355-62; see also Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v.
United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para. 730 (Jul. 24,
2008).
57. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 23.
58. See Sambiaggio (Italy v. Venezuela), 10 R.I.A.A. 499, 520-24 (Mixed Claims
Commission 1903).
59. See J. W. & N. L. Swinney (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.1.A.A. 98-101 (Mex-U.S. Gen.
Cl. Comm'n Nov. 16, 1926); D. Guerrero vda. De Falcon (Mexico v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 104106 (Gen. Cl. Comm'n Mex-U.S. Nov. 16, 1926).
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has caused harm, is in itself wrongful. It is interesting to note in this
respect that certain tribunals, such as the Tribunal in El Paso, have
implied that in case of acts of the State or State organs, the FPS standard
does not apply, being limited to acts of third parties only. 60 Other
tribunals have however, correctly, posited that the FPS standard applies
both to State and third party acts. 61
In this case, contrary to the responsibility of States for acts of third
parties other than State organs, the wrongful act is the act that has
caused harm. In case of acts of third parties other than State organs, the
internationally wrongful act is the failure to prevent the occurrence of
the act or the failure to apprehend or punish those responsible for the
act, assessed through the due diligence standard. This explains why due
diligence is of no relevance in the first case, but is in the latter.
There is some case law from investment tribunals, which discusses
this distinction. In line with the early case law mentioned above, it is
correct to state that the acts of State organs which result in an
impairment of the protection and security to be guaranteed to aliens
generally, and thus foreign investors and their investments, are wrongful
as such, without the need to enquire whether the State organ in question
was diligent or not. Tribunals have refrained from applying the due
diligence standard to the conduct of States and State organs, although
they have on several occasions explicitly referred to the due diligence
standard in general terms when discussing the contents of the FPS
standard. This may cause certain confusion as to the relevance of due
diligence when the duty of the State to abstain is concerned, but the
principle remains that due diligence is irrelevant in relation to the duty
of the State to abstain.
AAPL v. Sri Lanka and AMT v. Zaire are sometimes invoked in the

60. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 524 (Oct. 31, 2011 ). "El Paso did not specify or determine the duty to act
against a third party that has allegedly been breached by Argentina under the BIT: all the
impugned acts that allegedly violate the FPS standard are directly attributable to the GOA
and not to any third party. In the present case, none of the measures challenged by El Paso
were taken by a third party; they all emanated from the State itself. Consequently, these
measures should only be assessed in the light of the other BIT standards and cannot be
examined from the angle of full protection and security." Id.
61. See Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/8, Award, para. 355 (Sept. I I, 2007). "A violation of the standard of full
protection and security could arise in case of failure of the State to prevent the damage, to
restore the previous situation or to punish the author of the injury. The injury could be
committed either by the host State, or by its agencies or by an individual." Id. (internal
footnotes omitted).
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context of violence caused by State organs, 62 but as I will point out,
both cases did not relate to such acts. In AAPL v. Sri Lanka, 63 the
Tribunal indeed did not apply the due diligence standard to the acts of
State organs which had caused harm. 64 In that case, which concerned
the destruction of a shrimp farm and the killing of several staff members
of that farm during a military operation between the Sri Lankan Security
Forces and Tamil rebels, the Tribunal considered that Sri Lanka, by
failing to take precautionary measures to remove suspected staff
members from the farm through peaceful means before launching the
attack, "violated its due diligence obligation which requires undertaking
all possible measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the
eventual occurrence of killings and property destruction. " 65 This
finding was not applied to the acts of the State organ which had caused
the killings and destruction of property, since the Tribunal had found
that there was no conclusive evidence that the Sri Lankan security
forces had in fact killed the staff members and destroyed the farm, nor
that the acts had been caused by rebels. 66 Faced with the impossibility
of establishing who was directly responsible for the acts, the Tribunal
thus engaged in an analysis of whether the governmental forces were
capable of providing protection to prevent the destruction of the farm,
which indeed was assessed through application of the due diligence
standard. This assessment thus was alien to the application of the due
diligence standard to the acts of the destruction of the property itself by
the Government forces.
In AMT v. Zaire, 67 the claimant had sought compensation for the
destruction of property of one of its subsidiaries, and the looting in 1991
by certain member of the Zairian forces, which had resulted in the
destruction, damage and loss of finished goods and raw materials. The
Tribunal considered the host State in breach of its obligations to provide
FPS to AMT by having failed to take any measure whatsoever, but here
again, the Tribunal did not consider the acts in question to be those of a
62. See Gleider I. Hernandez, The Interaction Between Investment Law and the Law of
Armed Conflict in the Interpretation of Full Protection and Security Clauses, in
INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTfY ES 21, 35-38
(Freya Baetens ed., 2013).
63. See generally Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID
Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990).
64. But see Schreuer, supra note 42, at 5.
65. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, 562. (June 27, 1990).
66. Id. at 563.
67. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award
(Feb. 21 , 1997).
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State organ, since they were perpetrated by "separate individuals and
not the [Zairian] forces." 68
In more recent cases, Tribunals have explicitly referred to the due
diligence standard in general terms, but have refrained from applying
that standard to alleged acts of States, which had caused damage. In
Saluka v. Czech Republic, the acts in question were acts of the State
organs. The acts complained of consisted of the suspension of trading
of shares Saluka held in IPB, the prohibition of transfers of Saluka's
IPB shares, and police searches and seizure of documents. 69 After
setting out the contents of the FPS standard, which includes a brief
mention of due diligence, and limiting FPS to physical protection only,
the Tribunal rejected all claims in this respect, by arguing, without
taking the position that all acts complained of fell within the ambit of
the FPS clause, that the measures taken were not "totally unreasonable
and unjustifiable."70 The Tribunal refrained from applying the due
diligence standard to those acts, which moreover did not involve the use
of force, and in essence boiled down to claims of denials of justice and
lack of due process. 71 In that respect, I will refer back to this case at a
later stage.
In Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, the Tribunal considered that the
removal of the management from the offices or the seizure of the City
Water's premises, "even if no force was used [were] unnecessary and
abusive and amount[ ed] to a violation by the Republic of its obligation
to ensure full protection and security." 72 Rightly, no reference was
made to the "due diligence" standard in applying the law to the facts of
the case since the complaints related to the acts of Tanzania itself,
although ample reference was made to the standard in the preceding
paragraphs. 73
Another case at point is Teemed v. Mexico, in which the Tribunal
briefly touched upon the issue. 74 In that case, the Claimant had alleged
that Mexican authorities had not only encouraged protests against the
landfill it sought to operate through its subsidiary Cytrar, but also that
68. Id.
69. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 485
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
70. Id.
71. Id. para. 486.
72. Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 731 (Jul. 24, 2008).
73. Id.
74. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003).
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police and judicial authorities
did not act as quickly, efficiently and thoroughly as they should have
to avoid, prevent or put an end to the adverse social demonstrations
expressed through disturbances in the operation of the Landfill or
access thereto, or the personal security or freedom to move about of
the members of Cytrar' s staff related to the Landfill. 75

The Tribunal in Teemed differentiated the rules applicable to acts
of the State or State organs, or other acts which are otherwise
attributable to the State, but concluded that no evidence was furnished
to prove, first, the involvement of the authorities in the demonstrations,
and, secondly, in relation to acts of third parties, that Mexican
authorities "have not reacted reasonably, in accordance with the
parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the direct action
movements conducted by those who were against the Landfill," the
latter criterion being an application of the due diligence standard. 76
More recently in Tulip v. Turkey, the Tribunal mentioned the
distinction explicitly in an obiter dictum, and applied due diligence only
the conduct of State organs in relation to acts of third parties:
There is, therefore, no basis to conclude, that the State (assuming,
arguendo, that Emlak were an emanation of the State) planned to
engage in an unlawful seizure of land belonging to a foreign investor
or, alternatively, that State organs failed to exercise due diligence and
to prevent planned unlawful action by a private party. 77

Recent practice of investment tribunals thus shows that the
principles established by early case-law, namely that when the State's
acts impair the physical protection and security of foreigner investors
and investments, the due diligence standard should not apply, applies
equally in investment law. Based on the discussed cases, and since the
FPS standard without doubt is similar to or emerges from the IMS, at
least when understood as requiring physical protection and security,
there is no reason to depart from the principles applied in the past.
2.

The State's Duty to Protect Foreign Investments from Acts of Third
Parties
In line with the distinction made above, States' obligations in
respect of acts of third parties under the FPS standard of treatment

75. Id. para. 175.
76. Id. at para. 177.
77. Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, para. 433 (Mar. 10, 2014) (an application for
annulment of the tribunal's award was filed in July 2014).
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comprise several distinct obligations: first, the obligation to act with due
diligence to prevent such acts, secondly, the obligation for States to act
with due diligence to apprehend and punish those responsible for the
act, and thirdly, the obligation to possess and make available to foreign
investors a judicial and administrative system capable of preventing
acts, and of punishing and apprehending those responsible for the act.

i.

States' Obligation to Act with Due Diligence to Prevent Acts of
Third Parties

Although FPS is often not further defined in investment treaties, it
is the general understanding of the contents of the standard that it
requires the State to exercise due diligence in providing physical
protection and security to foreign investments and/or investors to
prevent acts of individuals that would cause damage. To that extent it
represents the classical understanding of the customary norm relating to
the protection of aliens described above, and represented in cases such
as Venable v. Mexico. This is the most common use that is made of the
provision in contemporary investment law and arbitration.
Such obligation does not entail any form of strict liability for the
host State. In Lauder v. Czech Republic, the Tribunal noted in respect
of an FPS provision:
The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the Treaty obliges the
Parties to exercise such due diligence in the protection of foreign
investment as reasonable under the circumstances. However, the
Treaty does not oblige the Parties to protect foreign investment against
any possible loss of value caused by persons whose acts could not be
attributed to the State. Such protection would indeed amount to strict
liability, which cannot be imposed to a State absent any specific
provision in the Treaty. 78
This understanding of the FPS standard of treatment is shared by
many tribunals. 79 Investment law cases over the past decade confirm
not only the existence of the due diligence standard to test State's

78. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 310 (Sept. 3,
2001).
79. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para.
164 (Oct. 12, 2005); Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award,
para. 483 (Mar. 17, 2006); Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 725 (July 24, 2008); Rumeli Telekom A.S v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, para. 668 (July 29, 2008); Toto
Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award,
para. 229 (June 7, 2012); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, para. 161 (July 30, 2010).
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behavior, but also the principle mentioned above, that the State is not
responsible for the acts of individuals as such, but only for having failed
to exercise due diligence in preventing harm caused by the act in
question. Such obligations also apply, and perhaps primarily, in cases
of armed conflict, civil strife or revolution, 80 in line with early case law
mentioned above which has applied this principles as part of customary
law. In the event of an armed conflict, a State indeed should use "the
police and military forces to protect the interests of the alien to the
extent feasible and practicable under the circumstances, both before the
event and while it unfolds." 81 Certain tribunals have used tests similar
to "due diligence," without however referring explicitly to a duty of
"due diligence." They have rather referred to a duty of "vigilance. " 82
In practice, the applied standard essentially is the same.
It is clear from arbitral practice that the State holds no strict
liability for harm caused by third parties. 83 Although not explicitly
referring to "due diligence," the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in
the ELSI case followed the same approach. 84 The ICJ in ELSI posited
that "the reference in Article V to the provision of 'constant protection
and security' cannot be construed as the giving of a warranty that
property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed. " 85
Considering the very close relation between FPS and the customary
rules governing the protection of aliens, this rule is not surprising, and
indeed conforms to the main principles mentioned above. An FPS
treaty provision understood as requiring the State to exercise due
diligence to prevent acts of third parties that would cause harm to

80. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 315 (2009).
81. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 166 (2008).
82. See, for instance, the statement by the Tribunal in Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v.
Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, para. 6.05 (Feb. 21, 1997) ("The
obligation incumbent on Zaire is an obligation of vigilance, in the sense that Zaire as the
receiving State of investments made by AMT, an American Company, shall take all
measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security of its investment
and should not be permitted to invoke its own legislation to detract from any such
obligation."); see also Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/4, Award, para. 84 (Dec. 8, 2000) (citing and endorsing this statement).
83. See SALACUSE, supra note 52, at 132, 209-10; Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic
of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 77 (June 27, 1990); Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmeda S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003).
84. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A, Judgement (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 108. (July
20).
85. Id.
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foreign investments and/or investors essentially is the same requirement
as the customary standard mentioned above. The same is true in respect
of the obligation for States in apprehending and punishing those
responsible for the harm.
ii.

States' Obligation to Act with Due Diligence to Apprehend and
Punish those Responsible for the Acts

The principle that a State is under an obligation, in case of harm
caused by acts of third parties to apprehend and punish those
responsible for the acts also is part of the FPS standard. 86 Besides the
preventive obligation mentioned in the previous section, States thus
have also a remedial obligation, 87 or in the words of the Tribunal in El
Paso v. Argentina, "a duty of prevention and a duty of repression." 88
This "existence of a duty of repression" again is very much in line with
the obligations under customary international law described above, 89 in
particular in relation to the conduct of investigations into the events that
have caused damage. Again, the principle of due diligence applies:
States should take all reasonable measures a diligent State would take to
apprehend and punish those responsible. As the Claims Commission in
Janes explained "[t]he culprit is liable for having killed or murdered an
American national; the Government is liable for not having measured
up to its duty of diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the
offender."90 At the outset I should note that this obligation does not
comprise the obligation for the State to act in due diligence in respect of
the conduct of a potential trial or the access given to foreign investors to
their judicial system. Such obligations are covered in States' general
obligation to possess and make available to foreign investors a judicial
and administrative system capable of preventing acts, and of punishing
and apprehending those responsible for the act.
Some investment tribunals have dealt with this question, and in
doing so have confirmed these main principles. One of the few
examples is Wena Hotels v. Egypt, in which the Tribunal explicitly

86. MCLACHLAN QC, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 41, at 262, para. 7 .190;
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 246, para 6.8.
87. See, e.g., Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/12, Award, para. 229 (June 7, 2012).
88. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 523 (Oct. 31, 2011).
89. See U.N. General Claims Comm'n, Reports of Arbitral, Lina Balderas de Diaz
(United Mexican States) v. United States ofAmerica, Decision, 106-108 (Nov. 16, 1926).
90. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 87 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1925).
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argued that the failure by the State to take action against those
responsible for the forceful seizure of Wena's property constituted a
breach of FPS. 91 No specific mention was made of due diligence
however, but this is understandable considering the complete absence of
any action taken by the host State. Another example is Parkerings v.
Lithuania in which the claimant had alleged the police did not find the
authors responsible for damages to its materials. 92 The Tribunal
however considered that there had been an investigation and that there
was no evidence that the process of investigation was in breach of the
applicable BIT. In Frontier v. Czech Republic, the claimant inter alia
alleged that Czech officials charged with investigating the criminal
complaints, which had been lodged against certain individuals, "were
negligent and did not proceed in an even-handed manner." 93 The
Tribunal, after confirming the application of due diligence to such
claims, dismissed the claim having concluded that there was no
evidence that the police authorities had been negligent or acted in bad
faith. 94
This State obligation of course is closely related to the general
obligation of States to possess a judicial and administrative system
capable of preventing acts, and of apprehending and punishing those
responsible for the acts. Indeed, the obligation to apprehend and punish
those responsible for the acts will in the majority of the cases rest upon
an assessment whether the foreign investors had adequate access to the
legal system to seek redress for the acts, which have caused harm.
Several cases, such as Parkerings or Frontier, have thus applied both
obligations.
iii.

States' Obligation to Possess and Make Available to Foreign
Investors a Judicial and Administrative System Capable of
Preventing Acts, and ofPunishing and Apprehending Those
Responsible for the Act

It is accepted that, under customary international law, States have
an obligation of due diligence in the administration of justice, very often

91. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award,
paras. 82, 84, 94 (Dec. 8, 2000).
92. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 326 (Sept. 11 , 2007).
93. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para.
423 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0342.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
94. Id. paras. 261, 436.
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also in relation to criminal acts towards the foreign investor. 95 This is
embodied in the FPS obligation to act with due diligence in
apprehending and punishing those responsible for the harm, but States'
obligations in this respect go beyond such understanding FPS standard.
States indeed more broadly have an obligation to possess, and make
available to foreign investors an adequate administrative and judicial
system capable of preventing acts, and of apprehending and punishing
those responsible for the acts. 96 I will focus here on the obligation to
possess, and make available to foreign investors an adequate
administrative and judicial system capable of apprehending and
punishing those responsible for the acts, and not on the obligation in
relation to the prevention of acts. The latter obligation, although
nothing would hinder its application in contemporary investment law
being part of customary law, has not been addressed by investment
tribunals.
This obligation has also been considered as part of the FPS
standard, 97 especially when it relates to acts of third parties that impair
the protection and security of foreign investors. As noted by the
Tribunal in Frontier: "In this Tribunal's view, where the acts of the host
state's judiciary are at stake, 'full protection and security' means that
the state is under an obligation to make a functioning system of courts
and legal remedies available to the investor."98 The obligation however
has also been considered more broadly to form part of the IMS or the
FET standard, especially when seen in relation to the obligations
relating to due process and the prohibition of a denial of justice, which
have been considered part of customary law. 99
This obligation, which indeed is close to the prohibition of denial
of justice, does not entail any due diligence obligation. The "due
diligence" standard here is inapplicable, and thus, one should not
generalize the application of the standard to the obligation to possess
and make available a judicial and administrative system capable of

95. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 246.
96. See generally JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57
(Cambridge University Press 2005).
97. See Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131, 144 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
98. Frontier Petroleum Services LTD. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
para. 273 (Nov. 12, 2010).
99. Katia Yannaca Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent
Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 111, 144 (August Reinisch ed.,
2008); see also Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award,
para. 129 (June 26, 2003).
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preventing acts and punish and apprehend those responsible for the
injuries caused. 100 The obligation to possess and make available a
functioning administrative and legal system is not tested against the due
diligence standard; due diligence applies only to the use by the State of
that system, not to the existence and availability of the system to a
foreign investor.
This is confirmed by several decisions of investment tribunals, but
these cases, although applying these principles, did not concern acts of
third parties which had caused physical damage to the
investor/investment. Rather, these cases concern the need for host
States to make available to foreign investors a functioning judicial
system for disputes with third parties more generally. While this may
seem surprising, it may at the same time simply be the application of the
customary principles to modem investment relations, where the State's
obligation to provide FPS not only covers protection from physical
harm, but also other types of harm caused by third parties. Whether this
is correct or not, will not be discussed here, and in any event, the same
principles apply, namely that due diligence is of no relevance to test that
State's obligation.
For instance, the Tribunal in Lauder considered in relation to the
FPS standard that,
The investment treaty created no duty of due diligence on the part of
the Czech Republic to intervene in the dispute between the two
The
companies over the nature of their legal relationships.
Respondent's only duty under the Treaty was to keep its judicial
system available for the Claimant and any entities he controls to bring
their claims, and for such claims to be properly examined and decided
in accordance with domestic and international law. 101

Because the Czech Republic had made a functioning system of
courts and legal remedies available to the claimant, who in fact had
made use of these possibilities, the Tribunal considered that there was
no breach of the FPS standard. 102
In Saluka, the Tribunal also considered that Saluka had been given
adequate access to justice to appeal certain decisions of Czech Republic
and that "nothing therefore emerges from the facts before the Tribunal
that would amount to a manifest lack of due process leading to a breach
of international justice and to a failure of the Czech Republic to provide
100. See discussion supra Section II.
101. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para. 314 (Sept. 3, 2001)
(emphasis added).
102. Id.
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'full protection and security' to Saluka's investment." 103 Again, the due
diligence standard was not mentioned.
In similar wording as the Tribunal in Lauder, the Tribunal m
Parkerings considered that,
The Claimant also criticized the Respondent for its passivity when the
City of Vilnius breached the Agreement. However, the Arbitral
Tribunal considers that the investment Treaty created no duty of due
diligence on the part of the Respondent to intervene in the dispute
between the Claimant and the City of Vilnius over the nature of their
legal relationships.
The Respondent's duty under the Treaty was, first, to keep its judicial
system available for the Claimant to bring its contractual claims and,
second, that the claims would be properly examined in accordance
with domestic and international law by an impartial and fair court. 104

In Frontier, also mentioned above in relation to the obligation to
apprehend and punish, the claimant had alleged breaches of an FPS
clause because of the failure for certain state agencies "to 'exert
pressure' on the bankruptcy trustees to properly protect the interests of
Claimant," and the refusal by Czech courts to recognize and enforce an
arbitral award related to the bankruptcy of two companies in which the
claimant had invested. 105 The Tribunal, after citing Parkerings,
considered that the obligation to make a functioning system of courts
and legal remedies available to the investor implies that the Tribunal
may verify whether "the courts have acted in good faith and have
reached decisions that are reasonably tenable," 106 which is reminiscent
of the due diligence standard, but it is not clear where the Tribunal
derived this from. The Tribunal finally found that a judicial system was
available to the claimant, and that although Claimant had availed itself
of that system only with limited success, there was no breach of the
principle of full protection and security. 107 No mention was made of
due diligence, despite extensive references to the principle in the
Tribunals general comment on the standard, 108 and similar wording. It

103· Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para.
485 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
104. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 333 (Sept. 11 , 2007).
105. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
para. 454 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0342. pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
106. Id. para. 273.
107. Id. para. 467.
108. Id. para. 270.
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is, however, unclear whether the Tribunal intended to convey the idea
that due diligence applies in this context as well. In relation to the
recognition of the arbitral awards, the Tribunal engaged in a rather
extensive review of the decision of Czech courts, but found that there
was no evidence that the court had "acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily,
or in bad faith." 109
3. FPS and Legal Protection and Security
Besides the requirement of providing physical protection and
security, certain tribunals have, in particular when the word "full"
precedes "protection and security," also extended the application of the
standard to "legal protection and security," making this understanding
of the standard in fact relatively similar to the FET protection
standard. 110 This understanding of the standard is different from the
idea that States should prevent acts of third parties and apprehend and
punish those responsible for harm caused to foreign investors, and the
obligation of States to possess and make available a functioning judicial
and administrative system, which are derived from the classic
customary norms on the protection of aliens.
Legal protection and security, in certain interpretations, in essence
would require States to refrain from taking legal or governmental acts or
measures that would hinder the proper functioning of the investment or
would contravene investor's rights. 111 It is thus an interpretation of the
standard that targets acts of the State itself, not of third parties. Certain
case law suggests that FPS requires host States to provide to foreign
investors a legal framework that guarantees legal protection to
investors. 112 As explained by the Tribunal in CME for example:

109. Id. para. 529.
110. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para.
613 (Sept. 13, 2001 ); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, para. 170 (Dec. 29, 2004); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para. 408 (July 14, 2006); PSEG Global,
Inc., North Am. Coal Corp., & Konya Ingin Electrik Dretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v.
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 258 (Jan. 19, 2007); Enron
Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award,
para. 323 (May 22, 2007); Compania de Aguas de! Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, para. 7.4.15 (Aug. 20,
2007); Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 729 (Jul. 24, 2008); National Grid v. Argentine Republic,
UNCITRAL, Award, para. 189 (Nov. 3, 2008).
111. See Schreuer, supra note 42, at 6-8; see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note
80, at 311.
112. Schreuer, supra note 42, at 10.
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The host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of its
laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and
approved security and protection of the foreign investor's investment
withdrawn or devalued. 113

This goes further than the obligations explained above, but seems
to add little to the protection offered by FET. Moreover, tribunals are
not clear on the precise scope of such protection because these issues
often are discussed in conjunction with FET. 114 Although it has been
suggested that this in fact had already been accepted, although not
explicitly, by the ICJ in the ELSI case, 115 such reference only is partially
correct. The question in the ELSI case in that respect revolved around
the question of the length of judicial proceedings in relation to the
administrative requisition of the ELSI plant, a situation covered by the
obligation of States to possess and make available a functioning judicial
and administrative system. It did not concern the "amendment of laws,"
to use the CME terminology. Therefore, the question discussed by ELSI
related to the more customary norms relating to the obligation for States
to make available a functioning judicial system than to an FPS clause,
which would include a stable legal framework as part of legal protection
and security.
In any event, when deciding claims in relation to failures to
provide legal protection and security, arbitral awards contain little
references to due diligence. 116 This is understandable and logical, since
the obligation is one that relates to the acts of the State itself or a State
organ which would breach the FPS standard, not the responsibility of
the State to act in relation to acts of third parties which have caused
harm to the investor or investment. Such obligation, in terms of the
standard applied, thus is similar to the obligation to make available a
functioning court system, which is not tested against to the due
diligence standard. This is also why due diligence in relation to FET, to
which the notion of legal protection and security bears much
resemblance is limitedly applicable.

C. Due Diligence and Fair and Equitable Treatment
Due diligence is also occasionally referred to when assessing
alleged breaches of the fair and equitable treatment standard ("FET").

113. CME Czech Republic B.V, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, at para 613.
114. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 312.
115. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 109 (July
20).
116. See generally Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16.
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The fair and equitable treatment standard is a flexible and rather vague
concept.
However, it is generally accepted that the legitimate
expectations of the foreign investor forms a key element of fair and
equitable treatment, 117 as are obligations of due process, transparency,
freedom from coercion and harassment, stability, predictability and a
general duty of due diligence. 118 Fair and equitable treatment also
includes the prohibition against denial of justice. 119
Because FET requires at least treatment in accordance with the
IMS as understood in general international law, 120 there is here again a
certain overlap between the two standards, notably in relation to the due
diligence obligations of States in relation to FPS. As the Tribunal in
Lauder explained: "fair and equitable treatment is related to the
traditional standard of due diligence." 121 Also, there is a certain overlap
between FET and legal protection and security. 122 This explains why in
several cases, Tribunals have held that if a State breaches the fair and
equitable treatment standard, this automatically entails a breach of FPS,
when the latter is interpreted as legal protection and security, 123 or have
dealt with both standards at the same time. 124 In such cases, Tribunals

117. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 279.
118. Id. at 277; see TUDOR, supra note 5, at 157, 186; see also Katia Yannaca Small,
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Development, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION l l l, 118 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
119. See Swisslion 000 Skopje v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/09/16, para. 262 (July 6, 2012); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note
81, at 163.
120. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 277.
121. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 292 (Sept. 3,
2001).
122. TUDOR, supra note 5, at 157.
123. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para.
408 (July 14, 2006). Note that Argentina filed a claim in annulment of the award, including
on the equation made by the tribunal between the two standards, and the lack of reasoning in
support of this. This was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee on the ground that, even
though this finding may constitute an error in law, annulment of an award is not possible on
such a ground only. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, paras. 183-84 (Sept.
1, 2009). See also Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,
UNCITRAL Arb., LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, para. 187 (July 1, 2004) ("The
Tribunal accordingly holds that the Respondent has breached its obligations to accord fair
and equitable treatment under Article II (3) (a) of the Treaty. In the context of this finding
the question of whether in addition there has been a breach of full protection and security
under this Article becomes moot as a treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically
entails an absence of full protection and security of the investment").
124. See Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
paras. 303-403 (Jan. 17, 2007) (stating that the Tribunal deals with both standards of
treatment jointly, without distinguishing or identifying a specific standard necessary to
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have not identified a specific standard necessary to violate the FPS
standard of treatment, which may be explained by the fact that if the
tribunal has already found a breach of the FET standard, a finding that
the State has also breached it obligation to provide the investor or the
investment with legal protection and security is unlikely to affect the
outcome of the decision. 125
More generally, references to due diligence in Tribunal's
discussion of the FET standard are rather sparse, such references being
only made when the FET standard is jointly discussed with the FPS
standard.
Indeed, Tribunals refer most often to the "legitimate
expectation" part of the FET standard, rather than due diligence. It is
therefore difficult to understand how the general duty of due diligence
would operate under FET, besides situations which are also covered by
the FPS standard of treatment. There is however one case in which this
was discussed. In Suez, the Tribunal defended relying on the concept of
"legitimate expectations" rather than "due diligence" in applying the
FET standard, but did not rule out that "due diligence" forms part of
FET as well, as had been argued by Arbitrator Pedro Nikken in a
separate opinion:
A State may violate an investment treaty's fair and equitable treatment
standard in many ways and with many differing consequences. The
majority's finding in the present cases that Argentina's various actions
violated the fair and equitable treatment standard by frustrating the
Claimants' legitimate and reasonable expectations is by no means a
rejection of the conclusions of our esteemed colleague Professor
Nikken in his separate opinion to the effect that Argentina failed to
exercise due diligence in certain elements of its treatment of the
Claimants' investments. The majority agrees that Argentina failed to
exercise due diligence, as that concept is generally understood, and
that such failure resulted in a violation of the treaties' fair and
equitable treatment standard. As discussed earlier in this Decision, the
majority of the Tribunal finds that Argentina's actions also frustrated
the Claimants' legitimate expectations and it has concluded that it is
more appropriate to base its decision on that rationale. 126
In a separate opinion, Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, criticizing the use
violate that the FPS standard of treatment); Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, paras. 7.4.15-17, 11.1 (Aug. 20,
2007). For a discussion, see OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law 24 (OECD Working Papers on Int'l Inv., 2004/03), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_ 3 .pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
125. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 277.
126. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, para. 248 (July 30, 2010).
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of the "legitimate expectations" of foreign investors as a standard in
relation to FET, argued that generally, FET represents a standard of
conduct for States, which should be tested against a due diligence
standard:
However, even as a current minimum standard, and even within the
concept that has prevailed in recent doctrine and in decided cases in
the sense that fair and equitable treatment is different from and
independent of the customary minimum standard, it could never lose
its essence as a standard of conduct or conduct of the State with
respect to foreign investments, which should not automatically
translate into a source of subjective rights for investors. The BITs
contain a list of the States' obligations regarding their respective
investments, not a declaration of rights for investors. Regardless of
what is considered the autonomy of fair and equitable treatment with
respect to the minimum standard, fair and equitable treatment
represents the degree of due diligence that the States Parties to the
BIT mutually pledged to observe with respect to the investments from
nationals of both States. The language used in the French Treaty
reinforces this interpretation, since the reference to the principles of
international law can only be understood, at least, by prescribing an
obligation of due diligence. 127

Nikken argued further that the due diligence standard should be
assessed by reference to "the canons of good governance" and "the
propriety of the government 'of a reasonably well-organized modern
State."' 128

The idea developed by Nikken essentially is to return to the
customary norms on the treatment of aliens, which I have discussed
above, in order to define the content of FET. In doing so, Nikken
extracts the application of the due diligence standard in customary
norms, and transposes its application more generally to FET, which he
considers to be a norm, which applies only to the conduct of States, and
could not attract any obligation of result. If one considers FET to have
its roots in the customary norms relating to the treatment of aliens and
the IMS, the due diligence standard indeed would be applicable, at least
in certain situations, which are similar to those discussed in relation to
FPS. The problem however is that several tribunals, including the
Tribunal in Suez, - rightly or wrongly - have interpreted FET as going
beyond the IMS, in which case the due diligence becomes of little or
127. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, para. 19 (July
30, 2010).
128. Id. para. 20 (internal footnotes omitted).
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subsidiary relevance, as is implicit in the reasoning of the Suez Tribunal
cited above. That is why there is little explicit reference to the standard
of due diligence in this context in arbitral decisions. Despite the
occasional references to due diligence standard in relation to FET in the
arguments raised by the parties, 129 discussions of the link between FET
and due diligence are uncommon in arbitral awards, which tend to limit
the use of the due diligence standard in relation to FET only to those
situations where there is an obvious overlap with FPS.

IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD
How the due diligence standard is applied is still subject to much
debate and tribunals are often sparse in giving explanations in this
respect. In general, one could describe it as an obligation for the State
to take all measures it could reasonably be expected to take in order to
prevent the occurrence of damages to the foreign investor and its
investment. 130 In case law, what would be required from a 'diligent'
State is not explained in detail and sometimes even absent. 131 This is
not surprising since it is difficult to define the standard in abstract terms,
as was moreover acknowledged by the Seabed Disputes Chamber in its
Advisory Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area:
The content of "due diligence" obligations may not easily be described
in precise terms. Among the factors that make such a description
difficult is the fact that "due diligence" is a variable concept. It may
·
ch ange over time
.... 132

129. See for example the statement by the Claimant, that [the FET] standard requires
the government to exercise "vigilance and use due diligence within its political and legal
system to protect investments." Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12, Award, para. 404 (July 14, 2006). Also, the argument raised by the Claimant in
Biwater Gau.ff that "[t]his series of public statements, according to BGT, was designed to
destroy, rather than maintain, confidence in City Water and inevitably undermined the
investment. This failure to manage the public expectations, and the actions taken to
undermine the public's confidence in City Water, together constitute a breach of the fair and
equitable treatment standard, in as much as they represent a failure to use due diligence in
the protection of BGT's investment, and the departure from BGT's legitimate expectation
that the government would at the very least maintain a neutral position and not tarnish City
Water' s image in the eyes of the public." Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United
Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para. 552 (Jul. 24, 2008).
130. SALACUSE, supra note 52, at 217.
131. National Grid v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Award, para. 189 (Nov.
3, 2008).
132. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS
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When the due diligence standard is applied by investment
tribunals, references are made to whether the State has "reacted
reasonably, in accordance with the parameters inherent in a democratic
state," 133 whether the State had "adopt[ed] all reasonable measures to
protect assets and property from threats or attacks which may target
particularly foreigners or certain groups of foreigners," 134 the obligation
for the State to "take all measures necessary to ensure the full
enjoyment of protection and security of its investments," 135 whether acts
lead to a "manifest lack of due process leading to a breach of
international justice," 136 the requirement for the State to "undertak[e] all
possible measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the
eventual occurrence of killings and property destructions," 137 whether
certain conduct "fell well below the standard of protection that the
Claimants could reasonably have expected," 138 the requirement for a
State to "take reasonable actions within its power to avoid injury when
it is, or should be, aware that there is a risk of injury," 139 or the rather
circularly formulated need for States "to act to prevent actions by third
parties that it is required to prevent." 140
Although difficult to define in abstract terms, a couple of elements
can be derived from the mentioned case law, in order to provide
contents to the notion of due diligence. First, reasonableness is a
common thread in determining which measures States should take. 141
The term however is, as is the due diligence standard itself, difficult to

Rep. 2011, para. 117.
133. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003).
134. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 484
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
135. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, para.
6.08 (1997).
136. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 493
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
137. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/87/3, para. 85 (1990).
138. Waguih Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, para. 448 (June I, 2009).
139. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 523 (Oct. 31, 2011).
140. E. Sugar B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, para.
203 (Mar. 27, 2007).
141. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 526 (7th ed.
2008); see generally Helge E. Zeitler, The Guarantee of "Full Protection and Security" in
Investment Treaties Regarding Harm Caused by Private Actors, 3 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB.
REV. l (2005).
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determine in abstracto. Reasonableness indeed implies an evaluation of
the measure taken by reference to what could be expected from a State.
And this precisely is problematic to define, since what could be
expected from a State cannot be described in general terms, and depends
more on the question of whether this can be objectively defined (cf.
Section 5). This is why the application of the standard requires a caseby-case analysis. In this respect some indication of the contents of
"reasonableness" may be found in the national treatment standard, in the
sense that treatment may be considered unreasonable if it is less than is
normally provided to nationals. 142 Some tribunals have also posited the
need for States to acts "in accordance with the parameters inherent in a
democratic state," 143 in order to further delimit what could reasonably
be expected from a State.
Secondly, such an obligation only applies when the State has
knowledge of the situation, or should be aware of the risk of injury. A
certain conduct of a State can, quite logically, only be expected if the
State has knowledge of the situation, and the burden of proof in this
respect lies with the claimant. 144 A specific request for protection
therefore is not necessary, but it will of course not only establish proof
of the knowledge, but it will also more easily serve as proof of the bad
faith conduct of the State in the absence of any measure taken by the
State. This was the case, for example, in Wena discussed above. This
idea moreover is very much in line with due diligence as understood in
international environmental law, to the extent that a State has to act
diligently in the event of foreseeable harm. 145
Thirdly, a State cannot be considered to have acted diligently when
the State has acted in bad faith or has knowingly refused to take any
measures whatsoever. In that case, indeed, a State will not be able to
claim that, being aware of the situation, it has taken reasonable
measures to prevent the act or apprehend and punish those responsible
for the acts.

142. Zeitler, supra note 141, at 16.
143 . Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003).
144. Zeitler, supra note 141, at 14.
145. See Duncan French & Tim Stephens, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in
International Law, First Report, INT'L L. Assoc. (Mar. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/study-groups/index.cfm/cid/l 045 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/4

34

De Brabandere: Host States' Due Diligence Obligations in International Investmen

2015]

V.

Host States' Due Diligence

353

THE OBJECTIVITY OR SUBJECTIVITY OF THE STANDARD

A debate exists as to the assessment of due diligence in this
context, namely whether it should be subjectively or objectively
assessed. Is "all necessary means" objectively definable or should the
specific situation of the state be taken into consideration? This
discussion exceeds the application of the due diligence standard, 146 but I
will focus here only on the assessment criteria of the due diligence
standard. Max Huber, in the British Property in Spanish Morocco case
mentioned before, 147 explained in detail the due diligence standard to be
applied, advocating the use of a standard which takes account of the
circumstances of the situation and the means available to the State. This
statement is worth reproducing in extenso:
Is the territorial State exempt from responsibility if it did what we may
reasonably request from it, taking into account the actual situation? Or
is the State required to guarantee some degree of security, being
responsible for any failure to provide it?
To require such means to correspond to the circumstances would
impose on the State a burden which it will often not be able to bear.
Also, the argument that the vigilance to be exercised must match the
importance of the interests at stake has not been accepted. Vigilance,
which from the point of view of international law the state is required
to guarantee, can be characterized by applying by analogy the Roman
law term of diligentia quam in suis. This rule, consistent with the
overriding principle of the independence of States in their internal
affairs, in fact offers States, for their nationals, the degree of security
which they can reasonably expect. As long as the vigilance exercised
clearly falls below this level compared to nationals of a foreign State,
the latter is entitled to consider this to be an injury its interests which
should enjoy the protection of international law.
What has been said about the due diligence with respect to general
insecurity arising from the banditry, applies a fortiori to the other two
situations envisaged above, namely common crimes and rebellion. In
the first case, to require a vigilance beyond the diligentia quam in suis
would require the State to provide special security services to

146. See Nick Gallus, The "Fair and Equitable Treatment" Standard and the
Circumstances of the Host State, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION, 223 (Cambridge University Press, 2011); see also Nick Gallus, The Influence
of the Host State 's Level of Development on International Investment Treaty Standards of
Protection, 5 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (2006).
147. See also Home Frontier & Foreign Missionary Soc'y of the United Brethren in
Christ (U.S. v. U.K.), 9 RI.A.A. 44 (1920).
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foreigners, which certainly would go beyond the scope of accepted
international obligations (with the exception of persons having a right
to special protection).
In the other case, that of the rebellion, etc., responsibility is limited
because the public authority is faced with an exceptional
opposition. 148

Huber distinguished between the due diligence obligations of
States in relation to acts committed by individuals against other States,
which indeed requires States to exercise a specific degree of vigilance
which may exceed the means available to the State, 149 and the due
diligence obligation of States towards aliens. Huber supported the use
of the diligentia quam in suis standard, which in essence requires States
to act respecting the same standard as they ordinarily observe in relation
to their own affairs. 150 This boils down to a culpa in concreto. 151 This
standard may be contrasted to the standard of a diligens paterfamilias,

148. Original in French ('L'Etat territorial est-il exonere, s'il a fait ce qu'on peut
raisonnablement lui demander, en tenant compte de sa situation effective? Ou est-il tenu de
garantir un certain degre de securite, etant responsable de l 'incapacite eventuelle de
l'assurer? ( ... ] Exiger que ces moyens soient a la hauteur des circonstances, serait imposer
a l'Etat des charges auxquelles il ne pourrait souvent pas faire face. Aussi, la these que la
vigilance a exercer doit correspondre a l'importance des interets enjeu, n'a-t-elle pu
s'imposer. La vigilance qu'au point de vue du droit international l'Etat est tenu de garantir,
peut etre caracterisee, en appliquant par analogie un terme du droit romain, comme une
diligentia quam in suis. Cette regle, conforme au principe primordial de l'independance des
Etats dans leurs affaires interieures, offre en fait aux Etats, pour leurs ressortissants, le degre
de securite auquel ils peuvent raisonnablement s'attendre. Du moment que la vigilance
exercee tombe manifestement au-dessous de ce niveau par rapport aux ressortissants d'un
Etat etranger determine, ce dernier est en droit de se considerer comme lese dans des interets
qui doivent jouir de la protection du droit international. Ce qui vient d'etre <lit au sujet de la
vigilance due par rapport a l'insecurite generale resultant de l'activite des brigands,
s'applique a plus forte raison aux deux autres situations envisagees ci-dessus, savoir: la
criminalite de droit commun et la rebellion. Dans le premier de ces cas, une vigilance
poussee plus loin que la diligentia quam in suis imposerait a l'Etat l'obligation d'organiser
un service de surete special pour les etrangers, ce qui depasserait certainement le cadre des
obligations internationales reconnues (en dehors des cas ou ii s'agit de personnes jouissant
en droit d'une protection speciale). Dans l'autre hypothese, celle de la rebellion, etc., la
responsabilite est limitee parce que la puissance publique se trouve en presence d'une
resistance exceptionnelle.' - translation by the author). See British Claims in the Spanish
Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain 1925).
149. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 31.
150. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL
LA w
(2011 ),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780195369380.001.0001/acref-9780195369380 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); Herbert
Hausmaninger, Diligentia Quam In Suis: A Standard of Contractual Liability from Ancient
Roman to Modern Soviet Law, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 179, 180 (1985).
151. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 210 (1996).
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or culpa in abstracto, 152 which requires States to act under a certain
Diligens
objective standard, namely that of a pater familias.
paterfamilias leaves no room for taking the specific means of the State
into consideration, since it requires States to act as a reasonable State
only, the State equivalent of the bonus pater familias. 153
Certain authors have argued that international law adheres,
generally, to the diligens paterfamilias standard, 154 which is also
supported by certain old cases. 155 In his 1955 Hague Academy Lecture,
Freeman noted that the standard of due diligence requires "nothing
more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a welladministered government could be expected to exercise under similar
circumstances." 156 This is an "objective" assessment criterion.
The objective standard has however been rejected by several
scholars, and arbitrators, which have instead relied on the "subjective
due diligence standard," taking into consideration the means at the
disposal of the state, and the specific circumstances present in the
state. 157 Brownlie for instance, following Max Huber, supported the
Brownlie
application of the diligentia quam in suis standard.
considered that, while no all-encompassing definition of due diligence
exists, the applicable standard is the standard ordinarily observed by the
particular state in its own affairs, which means that variations in the
wealth between States can be taken into account. 158 This is in line with
the application of the principle other fields of international law, such as
international environmental law. The ILC, in its Draft Articles on
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, for
instance considers that the "economic level of States is one of the
factors to be taken into account in determining whether a State has
complied with its obligation of due diligence," in relation to States
obligation of prevention, noting at the same time that "a State's
economic level cannot be used to dispense the State from its
obligation." 159

152. Id.
153. Cf Hausmaninger, supra note 150, at 180.
154. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 41.
155. See, e.g., H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 229 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1927) (referring to governmental action "so far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency").
156. Alwyn V. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of Their Armed
Force, 88 RCADI 1955-11, 267, 277-78 (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1956).
157. For an overview, see NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 310, para. 6.44.
158. BROWNLIE, supra note 141, para. 77.
159. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) Draft Articles on Prevention
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Investment tribunals have only very sparsely addressed the
question, and only in relation to the application of due diligence under
the FPS standard of treatment. Case law thus is very limited on this
specific question, which is also the consequence of the little information
Tribunals usually give in relation to what the due diligence standard
specifically entails. AAPL v. Sri Lanka is an exception, in that the
Tribunal spent much time on elaborating its understanding of the
standard. The Tribunal noted
A number of other contemporary international law authorities noticed
the "sliding scale", from the old "subjective" criteria that takes into
consideration the relatively limited existing possibilities of local
authorities in a given context, towards an "objective" standard of
vigilance in assessing the required degree of protection and security
with regard to what should be legitimately expected to be secured for
foreign investors by a reasonably well organized modem State.
As expressed by Professor FREEMAN, in his 1957 Lectures at the
Hague Academy of International Law:
The "due diligence" is nothing more nor less than the reasonable
measures of prevention which a well-administered government could
be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.
According to modem doctrine, the violation of international law
entailing the State's responsibility has to be considered constituted by
"the mere lack or want of diligence", without any need to establish
malice or negligence. 160

Despite references to the "old 'subjective' criteria" of due
diligence in that case, more recent cases suggest that the applicable
standard is a subjective due diligence standard. In Lauder, the Tribunal
considered that the FPS obligation "obliges the Parties to exercise such
due diligence in the protection of foreign investment as reasonable
under the circumstance." 161 In CME, the Tribunal also explained "a
government is only obliged to provide protection which is reasonable in
the circumstances." 162 The sole arbitrator, Jan Paulsson, in Pantechniki
v. Albania also unambiguously adopted the subjective assessment
method, distinguishing "physical protection and security" from "denial
ofTransboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, noted in commentary to Article 3, para.
13.
160. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 77 (June 27, 1990) (internal references omitted).
161. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 310 (Sept. 3,
2001).
162. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para.
353 (Sept. 13, 2001).
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of justice," the latter not requiring to take into account the resources of
the State, but the former allowing to take account of the resources of the
State:
A failure of protection and security is to the contrary likely to arise in
an unpredictable instance of civic disorder which could have been
readily controlled by a powerful state but which overwhelms the
limited capacities of one which is poor and fragile. There is no issue
of incentives or disincentives with regard to unforeseen breakdowns of
public order; it seems difficult to maintain that a government incurs
international responsibility for failure to plan for unprecedented
trouble of unprecedented magnitude in unprecedented places. The
case for an element of proportionality in applying the international
standard is stronger than with respect to claims of denial of justice. 163

In Frontier however, the Tribunal questioned in an obiter dictum
whether the principle posited by the Tribunal in Pantechniki is
applicable in situations not involving violence, without firmly
establishing that an objective standard applies. 164
Despite these ambiguities, the preferable standard is without doubt
diligentia quam in suis, when one deals with due diligence in relation to
physical protection and security. As noted earlier, the application of
due diligence in other fields of international law, notably environmental
law, allows taking into account the economic and other capabilities of a
State. This moreover conforms to the relevance of investor conduct
when making the investment, and the expectations of investors. As
noted by the Tribunal in Parkerings for instance:
The investor will have a right of protection of its legitimate
expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that its legitimate
expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances.
Consequently, an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could
change, and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the
potential changes of legal environment. 165
Which measures a State ought to have taken, as explained in
Section 4, indeed has to be determined by reference to what can be
expected from a State, and it would be difficult to accept that a State
should provide protection and security to investors beyond the capacity
163. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/21, Award, para. 77 (July 30, 2009).
164. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
para. 271 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
165. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para 333. (Sept. 11, 2007).

Published by SURFACE, 2015

39

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2015], Art. 4

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

358

[Vol. 42:2

of the State to do so. As noted by Huber, admitting the contrary would
require States to organize a special security service for foreign
investors, 166 which to date is only accepted in relation to certain specific
categories of protection individuals in international law, such as foreign
officials.

VI. COMPENSATION FOR BREACHES OF THE DUE
DILIGENCE STANDARD
As noted in relation to the customary rules, the responsibility of
States for breaching their obligations to exercise due diligence in
preventing an injury caused to a foreign investor or investment, or for
failing to exercise due diligence in apprehending and punishing the third
party responsible for that injury, is not an "indirect responsibility" of the
State for the act committed. The act attributable to the State is not the
act that has caused harm, but rather the failure to exercise due diligence.
As a consequence, in principle, the compensation awarded to a
foreign investor should be to provide reparation for the damage caused
by the failure of the State to exercise due diligence, not to provide
reparation for the damage cause by the act of the third party, as argued
by Max Huber in the British Property in Morocco case 167 and the
Commissioner in Janes. 168 As a consequence, "the measure of damages
for which the Government should be liable can not be computed by
merely stating the damages caused by the private delinquency of
Carbajal." 169 These principles still stand today. 170 This does not imply
that the compensation awarded may not take account of the damages
caused by the act, but this will depend on the circumstances of each
case. Indeed, in principle, the reparation should first of all remedy the
obligation breached, which is not the act of the individual, but the
obligation of the State to prevent an injury caused to an alien or
apprehend and punish the individual responsible for that injury.
The practice of arbitral tribunals does not reveal much in this
respect. First, findings of violations of the failure of a State only to
exercise due diligence in relation to FPS, IMS or even FET are almost

166.
1925).
167.
168.
Comm'n
169.
170.

British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain
Id. at 709-10.
Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 88 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.

1925).
Id. at 89.
See Crawford & Olleson, supra note 15, at 454-55.
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completely absent. In the majority of the cases, such findings are
accompanied by findings of violations of other treaty provisions as well,
such as those relating to the prohibition of unlawful expropriations, or
other aspects of the FET standard. Then, a finding of a violation of the
due diligence obligations of States does not influence the outcome of
the decision, nor the calculation of compensation. 171 Secondly, findings
of violations of FPS alone are relatively scarce, at least when compared
to findings of violations of other treaty standards. 172
In AAPL however, the Tribunal found that the State had failed to
exercise due diligence in launching an armed attack causing the
destruction of the farm owed by Claimant, and decided to calculate the
compensation based on the loss suffered by the Claimant by the
destruction of the property, although the Tribunal had not found that the
armed forces of the host State were directly responsible for the
destruction of the farm. 173 This may seem surprising. However, since
the legal basis for equating the compensation to the effective losses
suffered from the act itself, and not from the failure to exercise due
diligence is not explicitly mentioned, this decision may be read as
confirming the principle that the compensation awarded may be
equivalent to the damage caused by the act, but that this is not
automatically the case. In fact, when the failure to exercise due
diligence is applied to a failure to prevent the occurrence of harm, such
decision is perfectly arguable. However, when the failure to exercise
due diligence relates to apprehending or punishing the individual
responsible for the act that has caused damage, it seems more
appropriate to calculate the compensation differently from the damage
caused by the act itself, in line with the principles explained above.

171. See Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/22, Award, para 731 (Jul. 24, 2008) (where the Tribunal found violation of
legal FPS, but acts in question were not considered to have 'caused any quantifiable
financial or commercial loss'); see also Waguih Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, paras. 448, 450 (June l,
2009) (the Tribunal found violation of FPS standard and due diligence obligation of State,
but since it also found the State had made an unlawful expropriation, breached FET standard
and subjected the investment to unreasonable measures, there was no influence on
compensation). Further, the Tribunals found that a violation of FET entailed a violation of
FPS, and again, there was no influence on the calculation of compensation. See Azurix
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, paras 408-09 (July 14,
2006); see also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, paras 178-80 (July 30, 2010).
172. For instance, in Lauder, Saluka, or Rumeli Telekom, no violation of the due
diligence obligations of the State in relation to FPS was found.
173. L. F. H. Neer & Paulene Neer (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 62 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1926).
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CONCLUSION
This article has discussed the role due diligence plays in
contemporary international investment law; based not only on recent
practice in this respect, but also on the historical roots of the current
protection standards in international investment law. Such historical
overview indeed has been useful to describe the contours of the
application of due diligence in several standards of treatment, such as
FPS, the IMS and FET.
The article has demonstrated that especially in relation to FPS, due
diligence performs an important function. This function can be traced
back to the historical interpretations of the obligations of States in
respect to the treatment of aliens more generally. In particular, while
case law suggests that the acts of State organs, which result in a
deprivation of the protection and security to be guaranteed to aliens, and
thus foreign investors and their investments, are wrongful as such
without the need to enquire whether the State organ in question was
diligent or not, the principle of due diligence applies fully to the state's
duty to protect foreign investments from acts of third parties. Indeed,
FPS requires the State to exercise due diligence in providing physical
protection and security to foreign investments and investors from acts of
third parties, which does not entail any form of strict liability for the
host State. Such obligation also applies to the host State generally,
including in cases of armed conflict, civil strife, revolution or natural
disasters. The principle that a State is also under an obligation, in case
of harm caused by acts of third parties to apprehend and punish those
responsible for the acts, is considered part of the FPS standard, which
implies that States should take all reasonable measures a diligent State
would take, to apprehend and punish those responsible.
Whether viewed as part of the FPS or the IMS, it is clear that
States have an obligation of due diligence in the administration of
justice, also very often in relation to criminal acts towards the foreign
investor. This principle is similar to the obligation of due diligence as
understood in FPS, particularly in relation to the State's obligation to
act with due diligence in apprehending and punishing those responsible
for the harm. However, it applies more generally to making a
functioning judicial system available to foreign investors.
The
obligation in making available an adequate judicial system is however
not assessed by applying the due diligence standard.
In relation to the FET, this article has argued that because the FET
requires at least treatment in accordance with the minimum standard of
treatment as understood in general international law, there is a certain
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overlap between the two standards, notably in relation to due diligence.
References to due diligence in Tribunal's discussion of the FET
standard are rather sparse, such references being made only when the
FET standard is jointly discussed with the FPS standard.
As noted in relation to the customary rules, the responsibility of
States for breaching their obligations to exercise due diligence in
preventing an injury caused to a foreign investor or investment, or for
failing to exercise due diligence in apprehending and punishing the third
party responsible for that injury, is not an "indirect responsibility" of the
State for the act committed. The act attributable to the State is not the
act that has caused harm, but rather the failure to exercise due diligence.
In respect to the question of how the due diligence standard is
applied, although it is not only impossible to define the standard in
abstract terms, Tribunals require States to have knowledge of the
situation and to react to that situation by taking reasonable measures.
What could be expected from a State also cannot be described in general
terms, and depends on the question whether this can be objectively
defined. In that respect, I have argued that the preferable standard is
without doubt diligentia quam in suis, which allows the taking into
consideration of the specific circumstances of the cases and the means
available to the State.
As far as compensation is concerned, this article has explained that
compensation awarded to a foreign investor should be to provide
reparation for the damage caused by the failure of the State to exercise
due diligence, not to provide reparation for the damage cause by the act
of the third party. The practice of arbitral tribunals however does not
address this question in detail, notably because findings of violations of
the failure of a State to exercise due diligence in relation to FPS, IMS,
or even FET only are almost completely absent. There is however no
reason to depart from this principle, established since long in customary
law, and in line with the wrongful act in question, which is not the act
that has caused harm, but rather the failure to provide protection and
security.
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